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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-2810 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
REGINALD BROWN, 
             Appellant  
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 09-cr-602-3) 
District Judge:  Hon. C. Darnell Jones, II 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 18, 2013 
 
Before:   RENDELL, JORDAN and LIPEZ*, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: October 21, 2013) 
 _______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT  
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Reginald Brown appeals an order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.  He  
_______________ 
          * Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, United States Court of Appeals Senior Judge for the 
First Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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contends that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy.  It 
was, and we will affirm. 
I. Background1
On multiple occasions in 2009, Brown sold crack cocaine to Kile Lowman, a drug 
dealer under surveillance by the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”).  During that 
time, Brown sold Lowman “approximately a quarter-ounce of crack cocaine … once or 
twice a week.”  (Appellee’s Br. at 8.)  There were also 89 telephone calls between 
Lowman and Brown from March to September 2009.  According to Lowman, the 
purpose of those calls was “sex and drugs,” the “drugs” portion dealing specifically with 
Lowman’s purchase of crack from Brown.  (App. at 402-03.)  At Brown’s trial, Lowman 
testified about occasions on which he purchased crack from Brown for third parties who 
turned out to be informants working with the DEA.  During one such transaction, 
Lowman went to Brown’s house to buy crack for himself and a customer known as “Old 
Head.”  On a call recorded by the DEA, Lowman, apparently referring to the quality of 
the drugs, told Old Head that “[Brown] said this is some super hammer …. .” 
(Supplemental App. at 136.)  He also said that “[Brown] wanted to know what happened 
to me … I been sick dog.”  (Id.)  On two other occasions, Lowman brought “Ian,” 
another customer and DEA informant, to the street outside Brown’s house to purchase 
crack.  The first time, in August 2009, Brown was late and Lowman and Ian had to wait 
for him.  Lowman called Brown to see where he was.  After that phone conversation, 
 
                                              
1 In accordance with our standard of review, see infra note 2, we set forth the facts 
in the light most favorable to the government. 
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Lowman told Ian that Brown offered to buy them food because of the wait.  Later, 
Lowman received twenty-dollars from Brown “for bringing him Ian.”  (App. at 237.)  On 
another occasion, Lowman brought Ian to Brown to buy crack and Brown agreed that he 
would be willing to do deals directly with Ian in the future for “a dollar a piece,” i.e., a 
thousand dollars.  (App. at 248.)  Lowman testified that he agreed to this “[s]o we can 
keep him coming” and that he negotiated the price with Brown.  (App. at 248.)  Lowman 
indicated that Ian was in his debt because “we lowered the price.”  (App. at 249.)   
Eventually, Lowman was arrested.  When he went to jail, he made sure that Ian 
and Brown were in touch so that Ian could buy crack directly from Brown.  Ian told 
Brown that he knew Lowman had been making money off their past transactions and that 
he, Ian, would get money to Lowman in jail.  He testified that he told Brown “[t]hat 
whenever I do purchase the – the crack cocaine … , I’ll make sure [Lowman] continues 
to get money from it.”  (App. at 509.)  Brown evidently did nothing to disabuse Ian of the 
idea that Lowman should be part of the future deals. 
In 2011, Brown was charged with distributing crack and aiding and abetting 
Lowman in the distribution of crack, as well as conspiring with Lowman to distribute 
crack.  At his jury trial, Brown conceded his culpability on the distribution charges and 
the aiding and abetting charges, but challenged the conspiracy charge.  After the 
government’s case, he filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on that charge under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a).  The District Court denied the motion and the 
jury found Brown guilty of conspiracy.  He again moved for judgment of acquittal, 
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challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on conspiracy, and the Court denied the 
motion.    
Brown then filed this timely appeal.   
II. Discussion2
Brown argues that the evidence, even viewed in the light most favorable to the 
government, was insufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy because only a buyer-
seller relationship with Lowman was proven.  We disagree. 
 
The essential elements of a drug conspiracy are: (1) a unity of purpose between the 
alleged conspirators; (2) an intent to achieve a common goal; and (3) an agreement to 
work together toward that goal.  United States v. Iglesias, 535 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 
2008).3
                                              
2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We exercise jurisdiction over Brown’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the government.  United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 149, 154 
(3d Cir. 2006).  A jury verdict will be upheld if “any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).    
  “The final factor – an agreement between the defendant and some other person –
is the essence of the offense.”  United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir. 
2001) (holding the evidence was insufficient to establish a conspiracy when it did not 
show an agreement between conspirators to work together).  Because there is rarely an 
 
3 In a conspiracy charged under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government is not required to 
prove any overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.  United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 
10, 17 (1994).  However, to establish more than a buyer-seller relationship, the 
government must proffer sufficient evidence that the drug transactions were a “step in 
achieving the conspiracy’s common goal of distributing [drugs] for profit.”  United States 
v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 343 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 
F.2d 587, 593 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
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express agreement to break the law, the existence of a conspiracy is generally inferred 
from circumstantial evidence.  Cf. United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 
1999) (holding that buyer shared conspiracy’s goal of distributing cocaine, when 
evidence showed he bought on credit and knew about the larger drug operation, among 
other evidence).  However, it is well established that a buyer-seller relationship, without 
more, is insufficient to establish a conspiracy.  Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Price, 13 
F.3d 711, 727 (3d Cir. 1994) (reviewing cases establishing that a buyer-seller relationship 
standing alone is not a conspiracy).  Our decision in Gibbs lays out a set of non-exclusive 
factors to consider when determining whether a defendant is a member of a drug 
conspiracy, including: (1) how long the defendant was affiliated with members of the 
conspiracy; (2) whether there is an established method of payment in the transactions; (3) 
whether the transactions are standardized in other ways; and (4) whether there is a 
demonstrated level of mutual trust.  190 F.3d at 199.  In the end, “a conspiracy conviction 
may stand only if the Government proves the existence of an underlying agreement.”  
Pressler, 256 F.3d at 157 (emphasis in original).  
Brown contends that the evidence here establishes nothing more than a buyer-
seller relationship.  Citing two examples from Gibbs – the  exchange of “large amounts of 
drugs” and a “credit relationship” – he draws a contrast with this case, saying the 
quantities of crack involved here were relatively small and there was no credit extended.  
There was thus, in his eyes, insufficient evidence of “mutual trust” between himself and 
Lowman.  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 14 (quoting Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199-200).) We are 
not persuaded.  A large amount of drugs may reflect trust but a smaller amount does not 
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show a lack of it.  Likewise, while it is true that there was not a credit relationship 
between Brown and Lowman, that kind of relationship is not essential to proof of a 
conspiracy.  See Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199 (noting that the listed “factors are not necessarily 
dispositive”).  A dealer’s invitation to the defendant to come into a house with drugs in 
plain view can “reflect[] a level of mutual trust consistent with conspiracy.”  Iglesias, 535 
F.3d at 156.  So too can multiple contacts over an extended period of time.  Cf. United 
States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 345 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding sufficient evidence when 
defendants were at the house in which drugs were sold and had repeated past dealings, 
including numerous calls when drug shipments came in, with the conspiracy leaders).  
Here, Lowman went into Brown’s house and Brown told him about the “super hammer” 
quality of his drugs.  (Supplemental App. at 136.)  Brown had phone contact with 
Lowman with great frequency and, when Lowman was out of contact, Brown wanted to 
know why.  The dealing that both of them did jointly with DEA informants also reflects a 
mutuality of purpose beyond a mere buyer-seller relationship.  There is some evidence 
that Brown shared his profits, since he paid Lowman for bringing Ian in as a customer, 
and Lowman described negotiations with Ian as a joint enterprise: “[s]o we can keep him 
coming,” “we lowered the price.”  (App. at 248-49 (emphasis added).)  Additionally, it 
can be inferred that Brown agreed to help Lowman while he was in jail by selling to Ian.  
That evidence is enough to allow the conclusion that Brown and Lowman “agreed to pool 
their efforts.”  Pressler, 256 F.3d at 154 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Next, Brown argues that he “derived no benefit from these sales after the crack left 
his hands.”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 17.)  Reviewing the record in the light most 
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favorable to the government, however, the jury could have readily concluded that Brown 
benefitted from the sales because at least one customer, Ian, continued to buy drugs from 
Brown even after Lowman went to jail.  Brown also appears to claim that he was not 
Lowman’s sole source of supply for crack and therefore he and Lowman were not co-
conspirators.  Even if it were true that Lowman had other suppliers, however, exclusivity 
is not required to establish a conspiracy.  Cf. Perez, 280 F.3d at 343 (noting that even an 
occasional buyer can be a member of a conspiracy).   
Looking at the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the 
government, as we must, there is sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that 
Brown and Lowman had an agreement to achieve the common goal of distributing crack 
cocaine. 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
